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SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 
New Hope for Infertile Couples 
T
he concept of surrogate 
motherhood evolved approx-
imately four years ago in 
answer to the needs of some of the 
infertile couples in America. The 
surrogate mothering process is not 
currently regulated by law. 
Consequently, the viability of these 
programs as well as the rights of those 
individuals participating in the process 
are questionable. This article explores 
surrogate mothering arrangements, 
identifies the myths surrounding them 
and addresses the public policy issues 
that will allow for their continued 
viability. The author recommends that 
legislation be promulgated which could 
sanction surrogate mothering and would 
protect the interests of all parties to the 
process. 
Overview 
Studies indicate that there are 
approximately 2.5 million infertile 
married couples in America.! For 
various reasons, many of these couples 
are desirous of becoming parents.2 
Despite existing alternatives, however, 
most of these couples are denied this 
opportunity. Many infertile couples 
have unsuccessfully undergone medical 
procedures to correct the physical traits 
that prevent conception. Others have 
attempted the traditional adoption 
procedures to no avail. The waiting list 
for an agency adoption is several years.4 
Frequently couples are too old to be 
considered as prospective adoptive 
parents by the time their names reach 
the top of the list. Independent 
adoptions can sometimes be arranged.s 
Experts in the field of adoption 
,however, are difficult to find. Further, 
birth mothers can be difficult to locate 
and sometimes change their minds 
shortly before or after birth. 6 If the 
husband is the infertile partner, artificial 
insemination of the wife by a sperm 
donor is a scientifically viable 
alternative. Approximately ten to 
twenty thousand women each year 
undergo this procedure. 7 In vitro 
fertilization or "test tube babies" is 
another avenue. At the present time, 
under optimum circumstances, there is a 
ten to twenty percent chance of success 
with in vitro fertilization.8 Thus, women 
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with prior gynecological problems are 
usually excluded from the program.9 
The psychologial effects of the 
inability to have and to raise children 
can be devastating.!O The inability to 
bear a child is often considered a 
violation of societal values. It may result 
in marital problems, temporary sexual 
dysfunction, increased alcohol 
consumption, guilt and depression.!! 
Although support groups have evolved 
to help combat these difficulties,!2 they 
are often not an adequate substitute for 
the ability to raise a family. 
Surrogate mothering evolved 
approximately four years ago in answer 
to the needs of some infertile couples.13 
For those couples whose impediment to 
childbearing is the wife's infertility, 
another woman, the surrogate mother, 
is artificially inseminated with the sperm 
of the husband. To date, approximately 
two hundred children nationwide have 
been born by surrogates with the aid of 
approximately twenty five surrogate 
mothering agencies.!4 
Two such agencies are presently 
operating in Maryland.!S Surrogate 
Motherhood, Inc., of Columbia, 
Maryland is waiting its first birth during 
the summer of 1984, has several other 
pregnancies underway and expects the 
number of pregnancies to continue to 
increase.!6 For a fee, these agencies 
coordinate infertile couples with 
surrogate mothers and supervise the 
artificial insemination process and the 
pregnancy. The surrogate mother also 
receives remuneration for her 
participation. 
Surrogate mothering agencies are 
presently not regulated by law.17 
Objection has been raised that surrogate 
mothering arrangements violate existing 
laws against the sale of children as well as 
adoption and paternity laws. In 
addition, public because of the belief 
that these agencies encourage adultery, 
exploit economically troubled women, 
and are tantamount to prostitution. 
Although surrogate mothering 
agencies are unregulated!8 and diverse in 
their administrative procedures and 
requirements,!9 by legal necessity, all 
have certain requisites in common. Prior 
to insemination, the surrogate mother 
and the agency execute a contract. If the 
surrogate mother is married, her 
husband is included as a party to the 
contract. The salient features of this 
contract include the surrogate mother's 
and her husband's covenant to 
relinquish custody of the child to the 
natural father. The parties agree to take 
all steps necessary to terminate their 
parental rights. They further agree that 
the surrogate mother will abstain from 
sexual intercourse for a proscribed 
period of time prior to and subsequent 
to artificial insemination. Finally, the 
surrogate mother's husband expressly 
withholds his consent to the artificial 
insemination of his wife for the purpose 
of her bearing a child for which he will 
have any legal responsibility. These 
convenants are important, since under 
Maryland law, a child conceived by the 
artificial insemination of a married 
woman, with the consent of her 
husband, is their legitimate child. The 
consent of the husband is presumed. 20 
The convenant withholding consent to 
artifical insemination rebutts the 
presumption of legitimacy as to the 
surrogate mother and her husband. As a 
result of the surrogate mother's 
convenant to abstain from sexual 
intercourse, if paternity is judicially 
scrutinized, the issue should be resolved 
in favor of the natural father. Under the 
contract custodial responsibility 
remains with the natural father and he is 
assured that, at the least, the surrogate 
mother and her husband will use their 
best efforts to judicially terminate their 
parental rights. 
Prior to insemination, the natural 
father and the agency execute a second 
contract. The germane provisions of this 
contract are that, for a fee, the agency 
will attempt to locate a potential 
surrogate mother and will provide a 
physician to perform the artificial 
insemination.2! The contract specifically 
provides that no portion of the fee is for 
the purpose of facilitating the adoption 
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of any child. The reason for such a 
provision is to avoid conflict with state 
law. In Maryland, for example, it is 
unlawful for an agency to charge or to 
receive compensation for adoptive 
placement.22 Thus, under this contract, 
the ultimate adoption is not implicated 
and the agency is not precluded from 
charging or paying fees. 
A third agreement between the 
natural father, the surrogate mother and 
her husband is made. This contract 
includes those convenants previously 
elucidated as to custody and parental 
rights and obligations and further 
specifies the renumeration the surrogate 
mother will receive.23 For reasons 
previously stated, the natural father's 
wife is not a party to this contract. 
Once all contracts have been 
executed, the surrogate mother is 
artificially inseminated with the sperm 
of the natural father. The procedure is 
timed to the ovulation period of the 
surrogate mother and may have to be 
repeated before it is successful.Z4 
Within seventy two hours of birth, 25 
the natural father's and the surrogate 
mother's names are entered on the birth 
certificate.26 Absent a contract judicial 
determination, the effect thus far is that 
the surrogate mother and the natural 
father are the parents of the child. For 
inheritance purposes, the presumption 
that the child is the off-spring of the 
surrogate mother's husband has been 
rebutted by way of contract. Pursuant to 
the contracts, the natural father, and by 
necessary implication, his wife, 
immediately receive the physical 
custody of the child. To complete the 
process, the natural father's wife 
petitions the court for the adoption of 
the child. The adoption process 
however, presents legal and practical 
difficulties. 
As standard procedure, the surrogate 
mother's consent to the adoption must 
be obtainedP The birth certificate 
contains the name and address of the 
surrogate mother and this information is 
available to the natural father upon 
request. 28 However, the surrogate 
mothering process is conducted on a 
confidential basis. Thus, although the 
surrogate mother and her husband 
contractually agree to take all steps 
necessary to terminate their parental 
rights, absent an individual willing to act 
as an intermediary to preserve that 
confidentiality and a court amenable to 
accepting and protecting same, the 
consent of the natural mother cannot be 
obtained. Her consent could not have 
been obtained by the agency in that once 
the agency recognizes that the surrogate 
mothering process is for the purpose of 
facilitating an adoption, it is precluded 
from charging a fee. The effect is that the 
adoptive mother may not be able to 
meet the statutory mandates required to 
complete the adoption process. In such a 
case, a surrogate mother, who is a 
disinterested party with respect to the 
welfare of the child remains the child's 
parent and the woman who cares for and 
nutures him never achieves that status. 
The Issues 
A major issue of surrogate mothering 
involves the question of public policy.29 
In determining whether surrogate 
mothering is inconsistent with public 
policy, the judiciary must find: (1) that 
it contravenes an established societal 
interest; (2) injures the public or; (3) is 
inconsistent with sound policy and good 
morals. 30 Absent such a finding, 
surrogate mothering should be 
sanctioned and regulated in order to 
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bear a child. 
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meet the vital societal needs and to 
protect the interests of all parties. 
It has long been held that parents may 
not barter or sell their children nor may 
they demand pecuniary rewards as the 
price for their consent to adoption.33 
Such contracts are void as against public 
policy34 and the judiciary has applied 
this principle to a myriad of situations so 





provisions of the 
United States 
Constitution. 
as not to open the door to the unlimited 
sale of children. 35 The judiciary, 
however, has created exceptions to that 
general rule. Thus, in independent 
adoptions, the adoptive parents may pay 
the medical and hospital expenses 
incurred for the care of the mother and 
the child. 36 In Maryland, they may also 
pay the reasonable and customary fees 
for legal services.37 The contract will be 
sustained (1) if it does not contemplate 
the severance of parental obligation;38 
'(2) is in the best interests of the child;39 
(3) does not contain pecuniary gain as 
the natural mother's motivating factor;40 
( 4) or transfers custody to one with a 
legal responsibility to the child. 41 
Surrogate mothering has opened an 
unexplored area of the law which can 
have a profound effect on the lives of 
people.42 The judiciary will tend to 
construe the applicable existing laws 
narrowly,43 preferring to await a 
legislative sanction before recognizing 
these programs.44 For instance, in April 
of 1983 circuit court Judge Jack Mudd 
of Louisville, Kentucky denied a 
surrogate mother the opportunity to 
relinquish her parental rights based 
upon the following rationale.45 The 
court strictly construed Kentucky's 
presumption that the husband of the 
surrogate mother is the father of the 
child. 46 The court, however, could have 
construed the presumption as a 
rebuttable one, particularly if the 
husband had contractually withheld his 
consent and the surrogate mother had 
abstained from sexual intercourse. 
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In ruling as it did, the court indicated 
that children required the protection of 
someone other than those motivated by 
personal gain.47 However, most 
surrogate mothers are not financially 
motivated. 48 Reports indicate that they 
are motivated by their empathy for 
infertile women,49 a desire to have an 
impact on the lives of others,50 a desire 
to help infertile women,51 and a desire to 
do something truly "special" for 
another. 52 For those women motivated 
by the financial rewards, requiring them 
to maintain their parental relationship 
does not serve the best interest of the 
child. The prohibition against baby 
selling was designed to prevent the 
exchange of money as an inducement to 
the mother to give up her child. In 
surrogate mothering, the natural mother 
receives payment in consideration for 
becoming pregnant and carrying the 
child to term; she does not become 
pregnant for the purpose of maintaining 
a maternal relationship with the child. 53 
Thus, a requirement that she maintain a 
personal or financial relationship will 
result in psychological difficulties for all 
parties, financial hardship for the 
surrogate mother and is not conducive 
to the establishment of an appropriate 
familial relationship. 
The court was uncertain as to the 
environment of the natural father's 
home. 54 However, although the courts 
concern was germane it could have been 
satisfied by judicial inquiry at an 
evidentiary hearing. 
Fourthly, Judge Mudd felt that 
children could not be sold as if they were 
commodities.55 The common law 
prohibition against the sale of children 
developed during an era in which a 
woman, destitute and unable to 
adequately earn a living, would sell her 
child to a stranger. Clearly, that is the 
sale of children and must be prohibited. 
However, as previously indicated, this 
prohibition is inapplicable to surrogate 
mothering. Agreements to transfer 
physical custody and a personal pledge 
to terminate parental rights have been 
consistently recognized 56 as long as they 
meet at least one of the following 
exceptions. 
Once the child is born, validation of 
the surrogate mothering contract is in 
his best interests. 57 The surrogate 
mother has stated via the contract that 
she is not desirous of retaining physical 
custody nor does she wish to assume and 
exercise her parental obligations and 
rights. 58 The natural father wants the 
physical custody of the child and, in 
conjunction with his wife, wishes to 
assume and exercise his parental 
obligations and rights. He and his wife 
have planned for this child, made all 
appropriate arrangements, and the child 
has been living with them since birth. 
Thus, since custody should not be 
disturbed absent compelling reasons 
affecting the child's welfare59 and since 
the maternal preference rule has been 
abolished,60 the natural father should be 
allowed to retain custody. 
As previously indicated, pecuniary 
gain usually is not the motivating factor 
behind the surrogate mother's decision 
to bear a child. 61 In fact, one mother has 
seriously considered accepting no 
renumeration.62 Since the judiciary 
would not invalidate other altruistic 
acts, a surrogate mother should be 
allowed to carry her actions to their 
desired conclusion. 
By transferring custody to the natural 
father who already has a legal 
responsibility toward the child63 the 
fears that similar agreements will lead to 
the sale of children are circumvented by 
dealing with the natural parents and 
close family members.64 The surrogate 
mothering contracts should be 
recognized and the natural father 
permitted to retain custody of his child. 
It follows that the surrogate mother 
should be allowed to terminate her 
maternal relationship in favor of the 
natural father's wife, who cares for and 
nurtures the child. It is appropriate that 
her relationship be legally sanctioned 
and she be charged with the 
responsibilities concommittant to the 
role she has chosen to undertake. 
U.S. Constitution 
The judiciary and legislatures should 
validate surrogate mothering based 
upon certain provisions of the United 
States Constitution. The Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that, "no State shall deprive 
any person of ... liberty without due 
process of law. "65 Liberty denotes more 
than mere freedom from bodily restraint 
and includes the right of the individual 
to marry, establish a home, raise 
children and enjoy those privileges 
recognized at common law as 
fundamental to the pursuit of 
happiness.66 In determining whether a 
privilege is fundamental the court looks 
to the traditions and collective 
conscience of the people. Those 
privileges which are deeply rooted will 
be deemed fundamenta1. 67 Applying 
that test, the United States Supreme 
Court has determined that in the area of 
contraception there is a fundamental 
right to marita168 and individua169 
privacy. The United States Supreme 
Court has yet to define the outer limits 
of this right to privacy.71 This right has 
been applied to decisions not to bear a 
child72 but has not been tested as to the 
decision to bear a child. 
A state cannot regulate a woman's 
decision to become pregnant by natural 
means. 73 A contrary result would force 
her to seek governmental permission 
prior to pregnancy. However, in 
surrogate mothering, the natural mother 
becomes pregnant by way of artificial 
insemination. Whether a pregnancy 
thus created is constitutionally protected 
remains untested. However, since Roe v. 
Wade74 gave women the constitutional 
right to chose to terminate a pregnancy 
by artificial means and most states have 
sanctioned the use of artificial 
insemination as to married couples,7s it 
is only reasonable to conclude that a 
surrogate mother's decision to create a 
pregnancy is likewise protected. 
When the framers wrote the United 
States Constitution they "undertook to 
secure conditions favorable to the 
pursuit of happiness. They recognized 
the significance of man's spiritual 
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect 
.... They sought to protect Americans in 
their beliefs, their thoughts, their 
feelings and their sensations. 76 
Recognizing that they could not foresee 
what new changes and modifications 
might be indispensible in later years, 
they drafted the constitution in general 
terms so as to endure for ages.77 
Mindful of the framer's intent, the 
United States Supreme Court followed 
in their footsteps when the court 
announced the right of marital privacy 
in the area of contraception.78 By 
utilizing the Fourteenth Amendment's 
broad concept of personal liberty, the 
Court opened the door to an expansive 
array of activities that may be 
constitutionally protected. Thus, the 
constitutional protection afforded the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child 
should be extended to include an 
infertile couple's right to beget a child by 
way of surrogate motherhood. In fact, 
the Court of Appeals of Michigan has 
implicitly recognized this constitutional 
protection in the area of surrogate 
mothering.79 While a state may make a 
valued judgment favoring adoption over 
surrogate motherhood80 and need not 
remove obstacles in the path of infertile 
couples that are not of its own 
creation,8! to prohibit surrogate 
motherhood and thus foreclose the right 
of many infertile couples to beget a child 
would be to frustrate the purpose of the 
United States Constitution and to 
preclude the way of life and harmony 
previously sanctioned by the United 
States Supreme Court.82 
While the right of privacy means 
freedom from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion,83 not every state 
regulation which infringes on that right 
is invalid. Thus, despite the 
constitutional protection afforded to 
surrogate mothering, a state may 
regulate these programs. To date, the 
United States Supreme Court has not 
elucidated one definitive test as to the 
permissible scope of state regulation. At 
a minimum, the regulation must be 
reasonably related to the asserted 
legislative purpose84 and when a 
regulation frustrates or heavily burdens 
the exercise of a constitutional right, it 
will be validated only by a compelling 
state interest and must be narrowly 
drawn to express only that interest.8S 
Thus, under the latter test, only a 
regulation that directly and substantially 
interferes with a constitutionally 
protected right will be subjected to the 
strictest standard of judicial review.86 It 
is impossible to postulate as to which 
test the United States Supreme Court 
will ultimately apply. Undoubtedly it 
will depend upon the scope of the 
regulation before the court and the 
history of surrogate mothering 
programs as of the date of judicial 
review.87 
The following are some state interests 
that may support legislative action: 
1) A state may proscribe standards for 
maternal eligibility, impose medical 
requirements for a period prior to and 
after birth, and prohibit abortion at the 
point of viability. 88 The protection of 
maternal health and the potentiality of 
human life have long been accepted as 
compelling state interests.89 
2) A state has an interest in insuring 
the legitimacy and care of its children. It 
may arguably prohibit unmarried 
persons from participating in the 
program and may mandate the extent 
and· scope of parental obligations prior 
to and upon the birth of the child. 
3) A state has an interest. in insuring 
that its children are not "bought and 
sold."90 Thus, a state can mandate that 
the surrogate mother not terminate her 
parental obligations in favor of a person 
not biologically related to the child. A 
state may arguably regulate the profit 
motive of the surrogate mothering 
agencies and the surrogate mothers. 
With respect to the agencies, most 
should have no difficulty in being 
classified as non-profit.9! They could 
remain viable on the revenue generated 
by assisting natural fathers in locating 
prospective surrogate mothers and all 
personnel could continue to receive 
appropriate remuneration. 
If a state prohibited remuneration to 
the surrogate mother or limited it to 
nominal consideration, it would 
effectively foreclose one means of 
achieving parenthood for infertile 
couples. Although pecuniary gain is not 
the motivating factor for most surrogate 
mothers,92 the majority might justifiably 
not undergo pregnancy if the 
remuneration was removed. 93 The 
surrogate mothering process typically 
extends for a period in excess of one 
year.94 During this time, the woman 
subjects herself to the medical and 
psychological hazards and discomforts 
attendant to pregnancy and child birth. 
In fairness, she has the right to expect 
and receive remuneration. As a matter 
of due process of law, such a regulation 
would probably be invalid. The 
common law prohibition against baby 
selling is inapplicable to surrogate 
motherhood. Thus, a regulation 
predicated upon this premise would not 
be reasonably related to the asserted 
state purpose. The regulation would 
directly and substantially interfere with 
an infertile couple's constitutional right 
to beget a child. Since the legislative 
purpose is invalid, the state would have 
no compelling interest with which to 
validate their regulation. 
Under the present 




is not being 
abused. 
The fact that pregnant women who 
release their babies for adoption are 
prohibited from receiving compensation 
is not dispositive. 9s Those women 
would be paid as an inducement to 
terminate their parental rights in favor 
of a person not biologically related to 
the child. This is precisely what the 
common law prohibition sought to 
prevent. Surrogate mothers, however, 
are paid to become pregnant, to carry 
the child to term, and to subject 
themselves to the difficulties attendant 
to pregnancy and child birth. The state 
has other alternatives available to it to 
.control the profit motive. That is, it may 
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prescribe reasonable remuneration 
commensurate with the time involved in 
the process and the hazards and 
discomforts concommittant with 
pregnancy and child birth. As a practical 
matter the profit motive is controlled by 
individual self-restraint. At the present 
time, the surrogate mother receives an 
average of ten thousands dollars.96 On 
the basis of a one year process she is 
receiving one hundred and ninety three 
dollars and seventy nine cents per week. 
This is compatible with most entry level 
or para-professional salaries with one 
significant difference. Unlike her 
counterpart in the traditional work 
force, the surrogate mother subjects 
herself to her "job" twenty four hours a 
day throughout the process. Thus, she is 
actually receiving one dollar and fifteen 
cents per hour; a sum which is far below 
the national minimum wage 
requirements. 
Finally, a state has a valid interest in 
prohibiting unnatural sexual practices.97 
However, that interest cannot be 
extended to include consensual artificial 
insemination of the surrogate mother 
with the sperm of the natural father. In 
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney of 
Richmond,98 the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia upheld, and the United States 
Supreme Court summarily affirmed, the 
constitutionality of a criminal statute 
which prohibited sodomy as applied to 
homosexual aCtiVity. However, the 
District Court did indicate that it was 
proscribing homosexual activity 
because it, "obviously had no portion of 
marriage, home or family life. "99 Thus, 
it can be inferred that to the extent a 
non-traditional practice has a place in 
marriage, home or family life, it would 
receive the protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Whether this inference will 
be adopted by the United States 
Supreme Court is uncertain. However, 
an opinion of the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Texas 
is noteworthy. 100 By extending the 
individual right of privacy to private 
consensual sexual activity, the court 
validated homosexual activity on the 
ground that if it were not so protected, 
the states would have the power to 
intrude and regulate the intimate sexual 
relations of married couples. lOI That 
rationale is equally as meritorious when 
applied to surrogate mothering. That is, 
if on the basis of any of the interests 
previously elucidated, a state may 
prohibit surrogate mothering, then the 
state would be equally as free to further 
infringe on the right to individual 
privacy and proscribe the traditional 
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means of effectuating childbirth in order 
to insure that those same interests are 
protected. A state cannot so proscribe 
the traditional means of effectuating 
childbirth and, by analogy to Baker, the 
state may not prohibit surrogate 
mothering. 
Maryland has statutorily sanctioned 
the artificial insemination of married 
women. l02 To date, the statute has been 
applied to insure the legitimization of 
the resulting off-spring when the 
husband is infertile but his wife is 
capable of bearing children. Surrogate 
mothering applies only in the reverse 
situation. That is, the husband is capable 
of producing a child and it is his wife 
who is infertile. If Maryland now 
chooses not to apply that same statutory 
protection to this latter group of 
couples, the legislature and/ or the 
judiciary will have created a 
classification of individuals who are 
being denied the equal protection of our 
laws. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment lO3 guarantees 
to all individuals the right to be free 
from invidious discrimination in 
statutory classifications and other 
governmental activity.l04 In the context 
of the family law, the United States 
Supreme Court has developed two 
groups of tests to determine the validity 
of an equal protection challenge. 
The first group involves 
classifications that are not 
constitutionally suspect or impinge on 
constitutional fundamental rights. 
Within this group, several different tests 
have evolved. In 1972, the United States 
Supreme Court required that the 
classification, "be reasonable, not 
arbitrary and must rest upon some 
ground of difference having a fair and 
substantial relation to the object of the 
legislation, so that all persons similarly 
circumstanced shall be treated alike. "105 
This was a rigourous test and, in 1977, 
the Court lightened the government's 
burden by merely requiring that the 
classification rationally further some 
legitimate and articulated state 
purpose. 106 Still later, in 1980, the 
Court simply required that the 
classification not rest on grounds wholly 
irrelevant to the achievement of any 
legitimate governmental objective. 107 
This latter test creates a presumption of 
constitutional validity. Thus, any of the 
legitimate governmental interests 
previously enumerated with respect to 
due process would be sufficient to 
support a governmental classification as 
to types of infertile couples. 
If the classification is based upon 
criteria which are constitutionally 
suspect l09 or impinges upon a 
fundamental right protected by the 
United States Constitution,11O the pre-
sumption of validity disappears and the 
Court will strictly scrutinize the classifi-
cation to determine whether it promotes 
a compelling governmental interest. II I 
The infertile couple has a fundamental 
right to beget a child. Further, any 
classification which would deny them 
this right may be constitutionally 
suspect. In determining whether a 
classification is "suspect," the United 
States Supreme Court has considered 
two criteria that may be applicable to 
surrogate mothering. First, the Court 
has considered immutable characteris-
tics determined at birth.ll2 T raditional-
ly, this has been applied to classifica-
tions based upon race. However, if the 
reason it has been so applied is because 
race, like fertility, is a biological or 
genetic factor not subject to change, a 
liberal court may choose to apply this 
criterion to surrogate motherhood. 
Secondly, the court has considered 
political underrepresentation. l13 T radi-
tionally, this has been applied to 
classifications based upon alienage. If, 
however, the reason it has been so 
applied is protection of minority 
interests from legislation promulgated 
by those representing the majority 
viewpoint, again, a liberal court may 
choose to apply this criterion to 
surrogate motherhood. Should this 
latter test be applied, any statutory 
classification based upon types of 
infertile couples will probably not 
survive juducial scrutiny. The only state 
interest that is compelling is the 
common law prohibition against baby 
selling. Since that interest is inapplicable 
to surrogate motherhood, the classifica-
tion should be invalidated and surrogate 
mothering should be sustained. 
Existing Legislation 
Surrogate mothering programs meet a 
vital societal interest. The utilization of 
these programs will expand as the needs 
of infertile couples increase and 
surrogate mothering is recognized by 
these couples as a viable alternative to 
the traditional adoption process. 
Without appropriate legislation, all 
parties to the process are in jeopardy. 
Under the present law, the payment 
of compensation in connection with the 
placement of a child for adoption is 
unlawful. l14 Thus, a surrogate 
mothering agency that charges a fee or 
receives remuneration in consideration 
of assisting a natural father in locating a 
prospective surrogate mother may find 
itself in violation of the law and subject 
to criminal prosecution. I 15 
An individual is prohibited from 
placing children, "in homes or with 
persons" unless it is licensed by the 
state. 116 One of the goals of surrogate 
mothering is the placement of the child 
with its natural father. Surrogate 
mothering agencies, however, are 
exempt from the statutory mandate 
because the child is placed in the custody 
of its natural father. ll7 Under the 
present law, there is no assurance that 
the surrogate mothering process is not 
being abused and that the interests of the 
children born as a result of these 
arrangements are being protected. 
Every birth certificate is required to 
include the name of the surrogate (birth) 
mother. However, surrogate mothering 
programs are conducted upon a 
confidential basis. In order to achieve 
anonymity, the surrogate mother's 
name cannot appear on the birth 
certificate. To that end, it may be 
necessary for a party to delete the 
surrogate mother's name from the birth 
certificate, to provide or enter false 
information for entry on the birth 
certificate, or to alter the birth 
certificate. In the event that the 
surrogate mother's name is omitted 
from the birth certificate, the certificate 
will be deemed to be incomplete. I IS The 
occurence of the latter event will place 
the responsible party in violation of tht' 
lawl19 and will subject him to criminal 
prosecution.1 2D 
The ultimate goal of surrogatt' 
mothering is the adoption of the child by 
the natural father's wife. After the 
surrogate (birth) mother's consent to 
the adoption was obtained, 121 the 
natural father may request a copy of the 
birth certificate l22 in order to enable his 
wife to comply with the adoption law. 
However, such an action will place him 
in breach of his contract which requires 
him to maintain the anonymity of the 
surrogate mother. 
Surrogate mothering programs 
envision that the child will be 
considered to be the off-spring of the 
natural father. However, under the 
present law, a "child conceived by 
artificial insemination of a married 
woman with the consent of her husband 
is the legitimate child of both of them for 
all purposes. Consent of the husband is 
presumed."123 In the event that the 
surrogate mother is married, the law will 
require that the child be deemed to be 
the child of the surrogate mother's 
husband. Surrogate mothering agencies 
have eliminated this obstacle by 
requiring the surrogate mother's 
husband to contractually withhold his 
consent to the artificial insemination of 
his wife. This is problematic because, in 
the event of judicial review, the court 
may invalidate the contract, thus placing 
the surrogate mother's husband in the 
role of the child's parent. 
Finally, several courts have applied 
the common law prohibition against the 
sale of children to surrogate mothering 
and have invalidated these 
arrangements. 124 In that event, the 
natural father may not be allowed to 
retain the custody of his child and 
custodial responsibility may be placed 
with the surrogate mother. 
Additionally, the surrogate mother's 
husband may be deemed to be the father 
of the child and the natural father's wife 
may not be allowed to complete the 
adoption process. 
As of May of 1984, six states had 
legislation pending with respect to 
surrogate mothering. In New York, 
Assembly Bill 5537125 and Assembly 
Bill 6624126 were pending before the 
Assembly Committee on the Judiciary. 
These bills would eliminate the fee to the 
surrogate mother and would provide 
statutory guidelines for the practice. 
In Pennsylvania, House Resolution 
109127 was pending before the Rules 
Committee. This resolution provided 
for the appointment of a committee to 
study surrogate mothering. 
In Rhode Island, House Bill 6132 128 
was before the House Judicial 
Committee. This bill would add a 
"Surrogate Motherhood" chapter to the 
domestic relations code, would sanction 
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payment to the surrogate mother, would 
require a written contract, and would 
require the natural father and his wife to 
guarantee the adoption of the child. 
In South Carolina, House Bill 2098129 
would give the Family Court 
jurisdiction over surrogate mothering 
arrangements and would provide 
guidelines for the surrogate mothering 
contracts, the artificial insemination 
process, and the adoption of the child. 
Further, the Family Court would be 
required to order an investigation of the 
fitness of the adoptive couple, by a 
public or private child placement agency 
or a court representative, prior to the 
artificial insemination. 
In Michigan, House Bin 4114130 was 
pending before the Judiciary 
Committee. This bill eliminates the fee 
to the surrogate mother, but provides 
for the payment of those expenses 
actually incurred by her, i.e., medical, 
psychiatric or psychological expenses, 
attorney fees, living expenses and loss of 
wages. Further, the surrogate mother's 
written consent to the termination of 
her parental rights is required and is 
effective upon the birth of the child. 
Correspondingly, the bill requires the 
natural father and his wife to assume all 
parental rights upon the birth of the 
child, regardless of whether the child is 
born with "birth defects." In the event 
that the natural father or his wife die 
before the birth of the child, the bill 
requires the survivor of them to assume 
all parental responsibilities with respect 
to the child. In the event that the natural 
father and his wife die before the birth of 
the child, the surrogate mother's 
consent to the termination of her 
parental rights is void and the surrogate 
mother is required to assume parental 
responsibility for the child. The bill 
further requires that the following 
documents be filed with the Probate 
Court in the county in which the 
surrogate mother resides. That is, the 
surrogate motherhood agreement, the 
surrogate mother's consent to the 
termination of her parental rights, an 
acknowledgement by the surrogate 
mother's husband of the artificial 
insemination of his wife, an 
acknowledgement by the natural father 
and his wife, that they will assume 
parental responsibility for the child and 
an affidavit from a psychologist or a 
psychiatrist or an employee of a licensed 
child placement agency that the 
surrogate mother is capable of 
consenting to the termination of her 
parental rights. Interestingly, the 
surrogate mother is permitted to 
continuously update the Probate Court 
28-Thc La\\' Forum SjJrmg, 198; 
file so as to provide her most recent 
name and address. Upon reaching the 
age of majority, a child conceived by way 
of surrogate motherhood is allowed to 
obtain this information. 
In New Jersey, Senate Bill 481 J3J was 
pending before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. This bill presents a radical 
departure from Assembly Bill 3139132 
which would have made it a crime to 
participate in or to materially assist in a 
surrogate mothering arrangement. The 
former bill would permit an infertile 
couple to participate in a surrogate 
mothering program only if the wife is 
incapable of conceiving a child or 
carrying a child to term without 
significant risk to her life or if the wife 
has been unable to conceive for one year 
prior to the execution of the surrogate 
mothering contract. Further, the bill 
places the surrogate mothering process 
under the supervision of the Family 
Court, provides for the payment of all 
medical expenses incurred by the 
surrogate mother, sanctions the 
payment of monetary compensation to 
the surrogate mother, in an amount not 
to exceed ten thousand dollars, and 
requires term life and term health 
insurance policies for the surrogate 
mother and the infertile couple. The 
surrogate mother's written consent to 
the termination of her parental rights is 
effective upon the birth of the child and 
the infertile couple is required to 
institute adoption proceedings within 
ten days of the birth of the child. Finally, 
the bill requires that the records of the 
proceedings before the Family Court 
and the medical records relative to the 
artificial insemination be sealed. 
As a result of the present law and the 
sta tu tory ambiguities previously 
elucidated, surrogate mothering 
agencies in Maryland can flourish and 
grow. However, it is appropriate for the 
Maryland legislature to follow the lead 
of other states and promulgate 
legislature which would sanction 
surrogate mothering and protect the 
interests of all parties to the process. 
At a minimum, this would require 
special exceptions to those areas of the 
law previously cited, i.e., adoption, 
child placement,- vital records, 
legitimacy and the common law 
prohibition against the sale of children. 
Further, to insure the protection of all 
parties it may be appropriate to 
implement some of the provisions of the 
legislation pending in other states. 
Conclusion 
The presently existing adoption and 
medical procedures are not meeting the 
needs of many infertile couples who are 
desirous of establishing a family. 
Surrogate mothering is an answer to that 
need and should be sanctioned. The 
common law prohibition against the sale 
of children is inapplicable to the 
surrogate mothering process and the 
Equal Protection ClauseJ33 and the Due 
Process Clause J34 of the United States 
Constitution require that surrogate 
mothering be sanctioned, This can best 
be accomplished by the promulgation of 
legislation which would (1) protect the 
best interest of the child, (2) provide 
that surrogate mothering is conducted 
without abuse and (3) insure that 
surrogate mothering has no adverse 
psychological effects on the surrogate 
mother, the infertile couple or the child. 
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